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Abstract: We use a repeated sender-receiver game in which sender behavior is revealed to future 
counterparts either by (i) standardized computer reports or (ii) individual reports composed by the 
receivers. Compared to our baseline, both reporting systems significantly decrease the rate of 
deceptive messages chosen by senders. However, we find that computer reports reduce deception to a 
higher extent than individually written reports. This comparably higher impact can be explained by 
the senders’ anticipation of a high number of missing or deficient receiver reports that we find. We 
conclude that the precision of a reporting system has a higher importance for reducing deception than 
its personal character via individual feedback. Surprisingly, the reliability of computer reports is not 
correctly anticipated by receivers, who trust individually written reports more in the beginning and 
hence seem to back the wrong horse initially. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Moral hazard is a prevalent problem in economic relationships with asymmetric information as 
shown by Akerlof (1970). A large body of experimental literature has therefore investigated how 
deception can be reduced in one-shot interactions using a variety of pecuniary incentives from 
positive reinforcements such as voluntary payments (Angelova and Regner, 2013) to punishment (e.g. 
Church and Kuang, 2009). Other studies found that intrinsic motivations can also keep agents from 
deception, for instance though lying aversion (e.g., Gneezy et al., 2013) or image concerns (Behnk et 
al., 2014).1 
In environments with recurring interactions, an additional factor has proved to foster pro-social 
behavior among the involved parties: reputation (Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006). Danilov and Sliwka 
(2013) find that individuals are willing to increase their effort substantially in principal-agent 
relationships when principals receive information about the agents’ past behavior. In public good 
settings, ex post communication about the appropriateness of the players' behavior can lead to more 
cooperation (Zylbersztejn, 2014). With regard to deception, Kimbrough and Rubin (2013) have shown 
that reputation can indeed reduce dishonest behavior over time and that it works as a complement to 
pecuniary punishment.2 Moreover, Koch and Schmidt (2010) find that reputation is an effective 
measure against the deception-increasing effect of ex ante disclosure of conflicts of interest (Cain et 
al., 2011).  
In this paper we address a crucial condition for an effective reputation building to reduce deception in 
principal-agent relationships: an agent’s reputation can only be established if the underlying 
information is both credible and accessible for her future principals (Sobel, 1985). For instance, Gino 
et al. (2013) show that in a system with voluntary monitoring, dishonest behavior even increases 
compared to a setting without a monitoring regulation. We propose that a promising way to provide 
sufficient access to reliable information about past behavior is through the implementation of 
reporting systems. In general, the systematic provision of reports can be designed in two ways. One of 
them is through a central authority. Examples for such exogenous reports are the published results of 
product tests, typically conducted by consumer protection organizations, as well as the work of credit 
rating agencies evaluating the solvency of countries and corporations. These report types have in 
common that they are based on pre-defined criteria and are often provided in a standardized form, for 
instance by a point system (White, 2010). Furthermore, such exogenous reports are usually provided 
by a neutral player, who can make a more objective assessment of the agents’ behavior. 
The opposite case is the provision of endogenous reports, which are directly filed by the agents' 
counterparts. An example for this report type is the provision of consumer recommendations on 
commercial online platforms (Dellarocas, 2003). Since these reports reflect the principals' personal 
experience with specific agents and since they are provided in an individual form, they can potentially 
                                                 
1  Other factors that can lead to less deception are guilt aversion (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), the temporal 
distance between decisions and pay-outs (Ruffle and Tobol, 2014) and pre-play communication (Bicchieri and Sontuoso, 2015). 
Furthermore, there exists also the possibility to avoid deception from the beginning through the use of random devices 
(Kimbrough et al., 2013). 
2  Repeated sender-receiver games have also been used in other studies, such as Blume et al. (1998, 2002), Sánchez-
Pagés and Vorsatz (2007 & 2009) and Peeters et al. (2013). 
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enhance the perceived social proximity among the agent’s previous and future counterparts, 
especially regarding victims of the agent’s potential deception. 
We are particularly interested in examining which of these two approaches is most effective in 
reducing deception in repeated principal-agent relationships. The comparison of both report types 
allows us to shed more light on the trade-off between the standardized and objective nature of 
exogenous reporting and the personal and subjective character of individually written, text-based 
reports.3 
In this paper, we use a sender-receiver game with three different payoff scenarios, similar to the ones 
used by Gneezy (2005), to investigate how sender behavior changes over time with each report type. 
In our baseline without reporting, a receiver finds out about the honesty or dishonesty of the sender 
with 50% probability at the end of each round, representing the fact that moral hazard is not always 
observable in the direct aftermath of an economic interaction. Receivers do not get information about 
the senders' past behavior in the baseline. In a second treatment, we test the effect of exogenous 
reporting on deception, that is, the computer-generated reports regarding the sender's honesty or 
dishonesty. All reports regarding the respective sender are stored in his personal report list, which 
was available to his counterparts in future rounds. The third treatment was identical to the second 
one with one exception: the reports were now endogenously generated by the receivers themselves, 
in form of an individual text. 
Our results show that reputation building through reporting significantly reduces deception 
compared to the baseline. With regard to the question whether the two report types have different 
effects on senders, we find that computer reports lead to a significantly lower level of deception than 
receiver reports in all payoff scenarios. Regarding the dynamics of sender behavior, we find that 
deception even increases over time with endogenous reports, whereas the fractions of deceptive 
messages are stable when reports are provided exogenously. Our econometric models including 
individual beliefs show that deceptive senders are rather driven by first-order beliefs (whether the 
receiver accepts their proposal), which play an important role for strategic considerations, while 
senders who choose honest messages are mainly influenced by their second-order beliefs (whether 
the receiver expects a relatively higher payoff), which are related to guilt aversion. Furthermore, we 
use the three payoff scenarios to analyze how senders react to different payoff temptations and losses 
for their counterpart from successful deception. In line with the findings of Gneezy (2005), more 
senders transmit deceptive messages when their earnings are comparatively high, while the lowest 
level of deception occurs when successful deception leads to the most unfair outcome for the receiver. 
A qualitative analysis of the receiver reports provides a potential explanation for the higher impact of 
exogenous reports. It turns out that a substantial fraction of the receivers did not use the opportunity 
to report senders who transmitted dishonest messages in a proper way. Altogether, the inadequate 
reporting seems to be symptomatically due to the nature of the endogenous reports and is a possible 
                                                 
3  Abraham et al. (2016) investigate the effect of players’ subjective reports without a personal character, that is, in 
terms of a number-based rating of their satisfaction with counterpart behavior. They find that, in contrast to objective 
information, the subjective ratings increase investments and reciprocity in trust games only when information transmission is 
public. 
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reason for the substantially lower effect of receiver reports on sender behavior, who might have 
anticipated this lack of reliability from the beginning.  
Receivers do not seem to be aware of the endogenous reports' lower reliability and their lower effect 
on deception. Compared to the baseline, they show relatively more trust when reports are provided 
by them and their peers. It turns out that this difference is mainly driven by changes in their second-
order beliefs about the senders' relative payoff expectations. On the other hand, there is no significant 
difference in the trust levels between the baseline and computer reports. This finding reveals an 
interesting discrepancy between the agents’ and their principals’ perception of each report type, 
which leads to a suboptimal situation for all involved parties. We conclude that the reliability of a 
reporting system has a higher impact on pro-social behavior in our setting than its personal character. 
As a natural extension of our analysis, we ran further sessions with twenty instead of ten rounds, 
which enables us to evaluate the effect of exogenous and endogenous reporting systems in the long 
run. We were able to confirm the superiority of computer reports over receiver reports in the 
reduction of deceptive messages in all payoff scenarios with the longer time horizon. Interestingly, 
receivers seem to learn indeed over time and show relatively more trust under the exogenous 
reporting system in the long run.  
We organized the paper as follows: In section 2 we present the experimental design, treatments and 
procedures. In section 3 we state our hypotheses. In section 4 the results are presented and discussed. 
In section 5 we extend our analysis and analyze the long run effects of the two reporting systems 
considered. Section 6 concludes. The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix A. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1 Repeated sender-receiver game 
Our study is based on a repeated version of the sender-receiver game used in Behnk et al. (2014). In 
this experiment, we let subjects play the two-player game over ten rounds in all treatments. 
Therefore, eight subjects were randomly matched to form a group at the beginning of each session. 
Within each group, four subjects were randomly assigned the role of a sender while the remaining 
four subjects played the game as receivers. The roles were neutrally framed "Player 1" and "Player 2". 
Both senders and receivers were numbered from I to IV so that they could be recognized by their 
counterparts in later stages. Subjects remained in the same group and kept their role as well as their 
number during the whole experiment. 
In the beginning of each round, each sender was randomly matched with one of the receivers in his 
group and both players learned the assigned number of their counterparts. Except for this number, 
the game was played anonymously, i.e. none of the subjects learned the real identity of the others 
during the experiment. After that, three options A, B and C, which contained payoffs for both players, 
were presented to the sender. His task was to recommend an option to the receiver he was matched 
with by choosing one of the following three messages. 
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Message 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options. 
We used the strategy method by letting senders choose a message in each of the three payoff 
scenarios illustrated in Table 1. This procedure enabled us to investigate their behavior regarding 
different monetary incentives and various consequences for their counterparts. Independently of the 
scenario, option A paid the receiver more money than the other two options. Therefore, only message 
1 is an honest message, while the other two messages represent lies. We differentiate two types of lies 
by the payoff allocation they refer to. With the deceptive message 2, the sender recommended option B 
which provided him with the highest payoff at the expense of a comparatively lower payoff for his 
counterpart, whereas the payoff-equalizing message 3 recommended option C that led to an equal but 
Pareto-dominated outcome for the players. 
Scenario Option Payoff sender Payoff receiver 
1 
(low+;low-) 
A 5 6 
B 6 5 
C 3 3 
2 
(low+;high-) 
A 5 15 
B 6 5 
C 3 3 
3 
(high+;high-) 
A 5 15 
B 15 5 
C 3 3 
 Table 1 
 Sender and receiver payoffs by scenario and option (in euros). 
In scenario 1, a successful deception led to a comparatively low additional gain of one euro for the 
sender compared to an equally low loss for the receiver. We label this scenario (low+,low-), indicating 
how much senders earn (+) and receivers lose (-) from successful deception. In scenario 2, the sender 
obtained the same profit from successful deception as in scenario 1 but now at the expense of a higher 
comparative loss for his counterpart (low+,high-). In scenario 3, the sender was able to gain a profit 
from successful deception that was higher than in the other two scenarios, at the cost of her 
counterpart's loss that was equally high as in scenario 2 (high+,high-). We presented the scenarios on 
different screens and randomized the appearance of the scenarios and options to control for order 
effects. 
After the sender made a choice in each scenario, one scenario was randomly selected by the computer 
and the respectively chosen message was sent to the receiver. The receiver knew that there were 
three options available but she was not informed about the payoffs in each option and did not know 
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that the sender faced a conflict of interest regarding his recommendation task.4 After receiving the 
sender's message, the receiver decided whether to accept or reject it. In the case of acceptance, both 
players earned the payoffs from the option mentioned in the message. In case the receiver rejected the 
message, one of the two remaining options was randomly selected by the computer and determined 
the payoffs for each player. With this procedure, in addition to the presence of the third, Pareto-
dominated option, we limited the sender's possibility to be strategically honest, in the sense of 
sending a truthful message while expecting the receiver to reject it, as in Sutter (2009). 
In the end of each round, we presented the final outcome to the players. Senders always received 
information about the acceptance or rejection of the sent message, the implemented option and the 
earnings of both players. The final information shown to receivers was randomized in each round in 
the sense that, in principle, they only received information about their own payoffs. Furthermore, a 
possibility existed that all potential payoffs for both players in each option in the implemented 
scenario was shown to the receiver, which happened with 50% probability. In the latter case, the 
receiver could find out about the honest or dishonest behavior of her counterpart. Both player types 
were informed about this possible ex post disclosure and its probability in the experimental 
instructions as shown in Appendix A. We introduced this procedure to simulate the fact that negative 
consequences of moral hazard are not always observable in the direct aftermath of an economic 
interaction.5 At the end of the experiment, we presented the subjects' own payoffs from each of the 10 
rounds, their respective payoffs from the belief elicitation described in the following subsection as 
well as their final earnings, which consisted of their total payoffs from two randomly selected rounds. 
2.2 Belief elicitation 
After the subjects made their decisions and before showing them the final outcome of the round, both 
player types were asked to answer a series of belief-related questions. That the elicitation of 
individual beliefs can shed light on the different motivations behind the subjects' decisions has been 
shown by previous studies, such as Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Battigalli and Dufwenberg 
(2007), Peeters et al. (2012), and López-Pérez and Spiegelman (2013). We elicited subjects’ first-order 
beliefs about their counterparts' behavior by asking senders to estimate the fraction of receivers in 
their session who accepted the message. Receivers were correspondingly asked about the fraction of 
truthful senders. In addition, we elicited a more direct type of these beliefs by asking senders if they 
expected the respective receiver with whom they were matched to accept the message they had sent. 
Receivers were asked if they believed that the sender they were matched with had sent a truthful 
message. We also elicited how much the subjects expected to earn from the sent message as well as 
their second-order beliefs by asking how much they think their counterpart in the specific round 
expected to earn in comparison to their own payoffs. For both questions we used a five-point Likert 
scale with the categories “much less”, “less”, “equal”, “more” and “much more”. 
                                                 
4  We are dealing here with a game of asymmetric information and ambiguity. Even though this does not constitute a 
well-defined incomplete information game, the main purpose of our design is obtaining a better fit with real world situations, 
given the nature of deceptive behavior. 
5  Receivers could eventually learn the payoff structure of all scenarios in case all scenarios had been implemented and 
also disclosed to them over the 10 rounds. However this effect was limited since there were three scenarios and only a 50% 
probability of disclosure. This learning process was possible in all of our treatments. 
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We elicited all before-mentioned beliefs in each round in order to account for possible changes in the 
subjects' expectations over time. One exception was the peer beliefs which we elicited only in rounds 
one and five as well as in the last two rounds, since these moments gave us sufficient information 
about how the players expected their peers to behave. This procedure is based on our experience from 
a pilot and enabled us to reduce the duration of the sessions substantially. In the mentioned rounds, 
senders faced again the three payoff scenarios on different screens and were asked to estimate the 
percentage of other senders who had chosen a message that favored them in the specific scenario. On 
the other hand, receivers were asked about how likely they believed it was that other receivers had 
accepted the message sent to them in that specific round. 
Since the belief elicitation was a substantial part of the subjects' tasks during the experiment, we paid 
the players an additional amount of money according to the accuracy of their answers. In each round, 
subjects earned one additional euro for each answer that coincided with the other players' behavior 
or beliefs, depending on the question. For the first-order and peer beliefs regarding which we asked 
for a specific percentage, we used a simple quadratic scoring rule following Brier (1950) to calculate 
the additional earnings for each player.6 According to the scoring rule we applied, subject i gained one 
additional euro in case her estimation fi,j of the fraction in question j was correct. The more fi,j deviated 
from the actual fraction ft, the more we discounted from the subject's maximum payoff α = 1€, arriving 
at her final payoff πi as shown in equation (1).
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2.3 Treatments 
Our experiment consisted of three treatments which we used to test the effect of different reporting 
systems on deceptive behavior over time. Our baseline treatment, henceforth called T_base, follows 
the unmodified game structure described in the previous subsection. In this setting it was possible for 
senders to gain bilateral reputation since they interacted more than once with some or even all of the 
four receivers in their group, due to the random stranger matching, and learned the number of their 
counterparts at the beginning of each round. This design provided receivers with the possibility to 
remember the senders' behavior from previous rounds in which the payoff structure was disclosed to 
them. However, this information was neither stored for future rounds nor available to other players in 
the group since there were no reports available in this treatment. 
This bilateral sender reputation was also present in the two other treatments, but in these settings we 
enhanced the reputation building through different reporting systems. In our second treatment, we 
tested the effect of report provided by a central authority. In the end of each round in which the payoff 
structure had been revealed to the receiver, the computer generated a report regarding the honest or 
dishonest nature of the message sent. Since these reports were exogenously produced, we henceforth 
call this treatment T_exo. The computer did not distinguish between deceptive and payoff-equalizing 
messages but reported them as dishonest messages. The reason for this was to avoid any further 
                                                 
6  The advantages and limitations of using quadratic scoring rules to elicit beliefs in economic experiments are 
discussed, for instance, in Nyarko & Schotter (2002) and Palfrey & Wang (2009). 
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disclosure of the payoff structure to future counterparts and to circumvent an unnecessary labeling of 
the two kinds of lies. Hence, there were two reports with which the computer classified the sender 
behavior: 
"Player 1 has sent an honest message" 
"Player 1 has sent a dishonest message" 
The computer generated a personal report list for each of the senders. All reports regarding the 
sender's own behavior were stored in his report list, which contained one row for each round. In 
rounds in which the sender's behavior was revealed to his counterpart, the text "no information" was 
displayed in the respective rows. From the second round on and before making decisions, the sender's 
current report list was shown to his counterpart. In this way, the receiver had the possibility to 
observe the sender's past behavior before deciding whether to accept or reject his message. In order 
to ensure that the sender was fully aware of the information provided to the receiver, his personal 
report list was also shown to him in the beginning of each round. We present an example of how the 
information was presented to the receiver including all possible information types for the first six 
rounds in Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1 
 Example report list for the first six rounds in T_exo. 
Our third treatment T_endo was identical to the second one with one exception. The reports were now 
endogenously generated by the receivers with whom the senders were matched in the respective 
rounds, in form of an individually composed text with up to 140 characters.7 Both player types knew 
from the instructions that the purpose of the reports was to inform the following receivers about 
whether the sender had sent an honest or a dishonest message in the current round. But in contrast to 
the standardized computer reports in T_exo, receivers were not obliged to provide a report and were 
free to give any information, except, they knew from the instructions that they would receive a final 
earning of zero in case they used swearwords or insulted other players in their report. In line with the 
other treatments, receivers could not write a report in rounds in which the sender behavior had not 
been revealed to them. Accordingly, the text "no information" was shown in the respective rows of the 
sender's report list. As in T_exo, we showed each sender his personal list in the beginning of each 
round. 
                                                 
7  We limited the report text to 140 characters in order to urge the receiver to provide efficient information regarding 
the sender's behavior, referring to the established text format on social media platforms. 
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We summarize our treatments in Table 2. In each of the treatments, there were ten independent 
groups of eight players. Altogether, 40 subjects played in the role of a sender and another 40 subjects 
took on the role of a receiver. The samples were almost balanced between men and women. 
  Treatments Subjects 
Percentages of 
female subjects 
  T_base 
  Repeated sender-receiver game 
80 48.8% 
  T_exo 
  Repeated game with computer-generated reports 
80 42.5% 
  T_endo 
  Repeated game with receiver free-text reports 
80 53.8% 
  Table 2 
  Treatments, number of subjects and percentages of female subjects. 
2.4 Procedures 
We conducted the experiment at the LEE-Laboratory of Experimental Economics at the Universitat 
Jaume I in Castellón, Spain, and recruited 240 undergraduate students from different faculties through 
the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We ran six 
sessions, two sessions per treatment with 40 players each. The sessions lasted around two hours. 
Upon arrival, subjects entered the laboratory one by one, sat down in front of the computers and read 
the instructions. After that, the instructions were read aloud by the experimenter and the subjects 
answered a quiz question in order to find out if they understood the rules of the game. In case a 
subject did not answer the question correctly, the experimenters explained the instructions again to 
him or her in order to ensure a full understanding of the game. The experiment was programmed in z-
Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). After the experiment, we paid the subjects anonymously in cash. Subjects' 
final earnings were around €21 on average. 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
With our repeated sender-receiver game, we seek to answer the question whether reputation through 
reporting systems is able to reduce deceptive behavior over time compared to a setting in which only 
bilateral reputation building is possible among the players. We know from studies like Kimbrough and 
Rubin (2013) that reputation can actually lead to less deception. Furthermore, Behnk et al. (2014) 
have shown that the provision of ex post information about honest or dishonest behavior can reduce 
the rates of deceptive messages even in one-shot interactions, due to the agents' image concerns. 
Therefore, we assume that this image effect is even stronger in a setting in which an agent interacts 
several times with multiple principals who are given access to information about his past behavior. In 
addition to the image concerns, strategic considerations play an important role in our design, since 
receivers, although being blind regarding the payoffs in the beginning, had a say in the outcome of the 
game by accepting or rejecting the transmitted message. We suppose that reported dishonesty could 
therefore lead to less trust in the information transmitted by the sender in future rounds and, hence, 
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to a lower probability of the option mentioned in his message being implemented. A payoff-
maximizing sender should take this into account, since the possibility to lie strategically was limited in 
our game due to the fact that in case of a rejection the finally implemented option depended on a 
random process. Therefore, in the present experiment, we investigated whether senders deceive their 
counterparts less when their behavior may be reported to their future counterparts. Specifically, we 
tested whether the rates of deceptive messages are lower in T_exo and T_endo compared to the 
baseline without reporting. 
The second aim of our study is to investigate if exogenous and endogenous reports have different 
effects on deceptive behavior. The reports in T_exo were standardized and automatically generated by 
the computer. This procedure guaranteed an objective classification of the sender's messages in two 
categories, honest and dishonest, and assured at the same time that a report was filed in each and 
every round in which the payoff information was revealed to the receiver. The reporting system in 
T_endo differed from this system in the fact that reports were written in a free way by the receivers 
themselves. We assume that this fact turned the nature of the receiver reports into a more personal 
one with a human touch and could have created a more pronounced social proximity between the 
receiver and the sender's future counterparts than the computer-generated reports. This assumption 
is supported by a comparison of the freely written pre-play messages in the trust game of Charness 
and Dufwenberg (2006) and the pre-fabricated messages in the otherwise identical design of 
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010). Altogether, the standardized text led to a substantially lower level 
of trust compared to the personal messages. 
On the other hand, receivers were not obliged to provide a report and were free to give any 
information in their individual text, regardless of the actual sender behavior. In this sense, the 
receiver reports may suffer from a lack of objectivity in their classification of sender behavior and 
could therefore lead to less meaningful information for other players. Furthermore, manipulations 
were possible in the sense that receivers report a dishonest (an honest) message while the sender was 
actually honest (dishonest). The phenomenon of biased word-to-mouth information can be observed, 
for instance, in the popular field of online reputation through consumer feedback (Dellarocas and 
Wood, 2008). Interestingly, the effect of negative (positive) feedback does not necessarily lead to 
lower (higher) prices and sale rates on commercial online platforms, as shown in the review of 
Dellarocas (2003). Furthermore, in case the receiver did not provide a report at all, the personal 
character of the written text could simply not unfold its potential, which is supported by the 
theoretical analysis of Muehlheusser and Roider (2008). The authors find in their model that honest 
individuals refrain from reporting norm defections in equilibrium since they fear that damaging the 
reputation of others might backfire and lead to lower benefits from interactions with them in the 
future.  
Based on these considerations, the main objective of this study is to shed further light on (i) whether 
exogenous reports lead to a higher reduction in deception than endogenous reports despite the 
“human touch” of the latter ones and (ii) if so, whether this is due to receiver reports being less 
reliable than computer-generated reports. 
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Previous studies have shown that some people do not only exhibit lying aversion per se but also that 
their willingness to deceive is heterogeneous and that it depends on the severity of the lie (see for 
instance Fischbacher and Föllmi‐Heusi, 2013, or Gibson et al., 2013). In order to test the effect of 
reporting sender behavior regarding different monetary incentives for deception and different 
consequences for the receivers, we use a within-subject comparison of three payoff scenarios similar 
to Gneezy's (2005). In this setup, the second scenario (low+;high-) is the most extreme one since the 
sender can obtain a relatively low payoff from successful deception at the cost of a comparatively high 
loss for the receiver. This payoff distribution can therefore be characterized as a "mean" scenario. 
Since previous studies have shown in different settings that deception rates are substantially lower 
with this payoff distribution than in the other scenarios (see for instance Behnk et al., 2014), we 
evaluate whether the same tendency appears in the presence of reporting systems over time. 
With respect to senders’ beliefs, that we elicit, we are mainly interested in which belief types act as 
moderating factors of their behavior when we introduce reporting systems. Specifically, we 
investigate whether or not senders (i) expect more receivers to accept the transmitted message, (ii) 
believe that more receivers expect to gain a comparatively higher gain from the sent message, and (iii) 
whether or not they expect fewer players in their own role to choose deceptive messages in the 
presence of reporting systems. We further evaluate whether such effects are more pronounced under 
exogenous or endogenous reporting. 
Although the main focus of this study is to observe the behavior of senders, we seek to answer the 
question if the use of different report types increases trust in the information transmitted by the 
senders. This is important since the receivers' trust is a crucial condition for the establishment and 
functioning of principal-agent relationships. Consider, for instance, the case in which an uninformed 
private investor is reluctant to accept the service of a sophisticated market participant, who 
potentially faces conflicts of interest, which leads to a situation with a Pareto-dominated outcome for 
both parties. Since we assume that a sender's future counterparts' access to information about his 
past behavior lowers the rate of deceptive messages, this access should also lead to a higher trust level 
over time. We therefore investigate whether a higher rate of accepted messages appears in our 
treatments with reporting in comparison to the baseline with only bilateral reputation. 
We are further interested in the potentially different effects that exogenous and endogenous reports 
have on receivers’ trust. In line with our considerations regarding the lower reliability of endogenous 
reports, we evaluate whether receivers accept, on average, a lower number of messages in T_endo 
than in T_exo.  
The main questions that arise with respect to receivers’ beliefs when we introduce reporting systems 
are whether or not receivers (i) expect fewer senders to choose deceptive messages, (ii) believe that 
fewer senders expect to gain a comparatively higher gain from the sent message, and (iii) whether or 
not they expect more players in their own role to accept the messages they receive in the presence of 
reporting systems. As in the case of senders, we further evaluate whether such effects are more 
pronounced under exogenous or endogenous reporting. 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We start this section by presenting the aggregated sender behavior over time and the test results 
regarding the respective differences across treatments and payoff scenarios. Afterwards, we have a 
detailed look at which factors drive sender decisions by analyzing the role of individual beliefs in our 
setting. Consistently, we use the same procedure for receiver behavior and beliefs before we present 
our qualitative analysis of the individual receiver reports in the last subsection. 
4.1 Sender behavior 
We illustrate the senders' behavior in Figure 2 in form of the fractions of messages sent in each round. 
In the first row, the rates of deceptive messages in each treatment are shown per payoff scenario. 
Observe that in almost every round of the three scenarios, the highest level of deception is reached in 
the baseline without reporting. On average, around 50% of the senders' messages were deceptive in 
scenarios 1 and 2 compared to a deception level of almost 70% in the third scenario. With computer-
generated reports, the fractions of deceptive messages are substantially lower in all rounds of each 
scenario with around 30% deceptive messages in scenarios 1 and 2, and again a higher fraction of 
over 50% deception in scenario 3. However, receiver reports reduce deception only to an 
intermediate level of 40% deceptive messages in scenarios 1 and 2 as well as 60% in scenario 3. 
 
Figure 2 
Fractions of messages chosen by senders per scenario and treatment (x-axis: rounds; y-axis: message fractions). 
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In order to test for general differences in deception among our three treatments, we compared the 
average fractions of deceptive messages sent between the first round and round nine per scenario and 
treatment.8 These fractions and the respective results of the McNemar tests, which we used in order to 
control for the repeated measures, are presented in Table 3. In each of the scenarios, we find a 
significantly lower deception rate in both treatments with reporting compared to the baseline, except 
for the difference between T_base and T_endo in scenario 1, which is marginally significant. The 
decline in deception with reporting is substantial and amounts up to over 18 percentage points. 
Result 1: Compared to the baseline, reputation building through reporting systems significantly reduces 
the average fraction of deceptive messages. 
  Average fractions - % Treatment differences - McNemar's chi2 
Message 
type 
Scenario   T_base   T_exo   T_endo 
T_base 
vs. T_exo 
T_base 
vs. T_endo 
T_exo 
vs. T_endo 
 1 49.7 32.8 42.5 21.02***   3.56*   7.61*** 
Deception 2 46.1 27.8 37.5 23.42***   5.03**   7.52*** 
 3 67.8 51.9 60.0 17.01***   4.40** 4.75** 
 1 30.6 41.7 37.5 10.00***   4.37**          1.32 
Honesty 2 36.9 48.6 46.4    9.28***   7.22***          0.33 
 3 18.6 26.1 23.3    5.93**   2.60          0.79 
Payoff-
equalization 
1 19.7 25.6 20.0    3.32*   0.01          2.99* 
2 16.9 23.6 16.1    4.88**   0.09          6.13*** 
3 13.6 21.9 16.7    7.76***   1.27          3.25* 
         Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1 
Table 3 
Average message fractions and McNemar test results for differences in sender behavior across treatments in 
each payoff scenario (rounds 1-9). 
In order to answer the question if the two report types have different effects on deception, we 
compared the average message fractions between T_exo and T_endo in the last column of Table 3. We 
find that computer reports lead to a significantly lower level of deception than receiver reports in all 
payoff scenarios. 
Result 2: The fractions of deceptive messages are significantly lower with exogenous reports than with 
endogenous reports. 
Honesty is not the only alternative to deception in our design since senders could also recommend the 
option with equal but Pareto-dominated payoffs. Therefore, we also run McNemar tests to analyze the 
differences among the rates of honest messages and find that exogenous reports lead to a signficant 
increase in honest behavior in all scenarios. The fractions of honest messages are significantly higher 
with endogenous reports in scenarios 1 and 2 but not in scenario 3. Hence, the provision of receiver 
                                                 
8  Subjects knew from the instructions that no interactions would take place after round 10 and, hence, that the final 
report would have no consequences for their further reputation. It is possible that this fact led to an exaggerated behavior in the 
last round of our experiment. Observe in Figure 1 that the highest fraction of deceptive messages in our baseline is reached in 
the final round in scenarios 1 and 2 in addition to a comparatively high fraction in scenario 3. On the other hand, the rate of 
deception decreases substantially in the last round in the reporting treatments, except for scenario 2 in T_endo. In order to 
account for this possible endgame effect, we excluded the last round from all our analyses of sender and receiver behavior. 
When we include the final round into the analysis, we obtain results that are overall similar to the ones presented in this 
section. 
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reports is not a sufficient incentive to increase honesty when senders can obtain a comparatively high 
payoff from successful deception. These findings are in line with our previous assumptions that 
reports have a positive effect on sender behavior and that this effect is comparatively stronger with 
computer-generated reports. However, we do not find significant differences in honest messages 
between the two report types. 
Interestingly, a substantial part of up to 26% of the senders decided to transmit payoff-equalizing 
messages, which is similar to the findings in the one-shot version of the game in Behnk et al. (2014). 
Our tests show a significantly higher fraction of payoff-equalizing messages for exogenous reports in 
scenarios 2 and 3 compared to the baseline but no significant effects for endogenous reports.  
We ran additional tests regarding the within-subject differences across payoff scenarios. Observe in 
Table 3 that the highest rates of deceptive messages are reached in scenario 3. In all treatments, the 
differences between scenario 3 and the other scenarios are significant at the 0.01 level according to 
McNemar tests. While we do not find a significant difference between scenarios 1 and 2 in the 
baseline, significantly fewer deceptive messages are sent in the mean scenario 2 compared to scenario 
1 in T_exo (p=0.042). The same appears in T_endo, yet the difference is only marginally significant 
(p=0.089). We can summarize that senders are tempted by the comparatively higher earnings in 
scenario 3 regardless of the presence of a reporting system, which is in line with the pattern that has 
been found in Gneezy (2005). However, the receiver's relative loss from successful deception seems to 
play a role for the sender's decision in our repeated game only when his behavior is reported to his 
future counterparts. Receiver reports show again a comparatively weaker effect. 
Result 3: When reporting systems are present, fewer deceptive messages are sent in scenario 2 compared 
to the other scenarios. However, this difference is only marginally significant for receiver reports. 
With regard to honest messages we find a pattern that mirrors the effects of different payoff 
distributions on deception. The level of honesty is significantly lower in scenario 3 than in the other 
two scenarios in all treatments. Significances are at the 0.01 level, except for the difference between 
honest messages in scenarios 1 and 2 in the baseline (p=0.020). Furthermore, we find a significantly 
lower rate of payoff-equalizing messages in scenario 3 compared to scenario 1 in the baseline 
(p=0.002). Other differences are not significant at conventional levels. 
In a final step, we have a look at the dynamics of sender behavior in each combination of treatments 
and scenarios. In order to test for possible trends, we calculate the fraction of senders who 
transmitted the respective message type at the group level in each round, obtaining the ordered 
values {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, and use the Cuzick trend test (Cuzick, 1985). In T_base, the tests show a 
moderate upward trend for the fraction of deceptive messages in scenario 1 (p=0.001). Since 
reputation is only bilateral in the baseline, senders might have learned over time that receivers are 
not fully aware of their previous behavior. On the other hand, we also find a significant upward trend 
in scenario 3 (p=0.001) and marginally significant upward trends in scenarios 1 (p=0.071) and 2 
(p=0.079) in T_endo. Furthermore, we do not find such trends in T_exo, reflecting the relatively 
stronger effect of computer reports on deceptive behavior. 
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The fractions of honest messages show a comparatively higher dynamic over time. Although both 
report types lead to a significantly higher level of honesty, senders gradually become less honest over 
the rounds in almost all treatments and scenarios with significances at conventional levels. The only 
exceptions are the fractions of honest messages in scenario 3 of T_base and T_exo where we do not 
find significant trends, possibly due to the strong monetary temptations from successful deception in 
this scenario which lead to an already substantially higher level of deception from the beginning. Since 
the fraction of honest messages decreases over time regardless of the treatment, this effect cannot be 
attributed to the reporting but seems to be due to the general reputation building in our design.  
Result 4: The fractions of deceptive messages are stable over time with exogenous reports, but follow an 
upward trend with endogenous reports. On the other hand, the rates of honest messages exhibit a 
generally decreasing pattern over time. 
A potential explanation for this effect is that some senders take the accumulated earnings of both 
players into account and decide to claim a bigger slice of the pie after recommending options that 
favor their counterparts instead of themselves in several rounds. A second explanation would be that 
some senders, who are already stigmatized by reported acts of dishonesty, might expect their future 
counterparts to trust their messages less anyway and hence tend to refrain from being honest more 
often in future rounds. However, further investigation is needed with regards to why fewer senders 
behave less honestly over time even when reports about their behavior are available. Finally, we 
obtain mixed trend results regarding the payoff-equalizing messages. While the fraction of senders 
who transmit such messages follows a significant upward trend in all scenarios of T_exo, these trends 
turned out to be significant only in scenario 1 of T_endo and in scenario 2 of T_base. 
4.2 Sender beliefs 
We turn now to an analysis of the senders' beliefs as potential determinants of their behavior in our 
experiment. In Table 4, we present the averages of both the first-order beliefs on message acceptance 
and the peer beliefs about other senders transmitting deceptive messages as well as the respective 
percentages of the senders' second-order beliefs about their counterparts’ relative payoff 
expectations. 
Sender beliefs Treatments 
 T_base T_exo T_endo 
First-order beliefs about receiver actions Means 
Percentage of receivers accepting the message 49.36 46.19 45.24 
Second-order beliefs about relative payoffs Percentages 
Higher or much higher than sender’s payoffs 43.33 34.72 47.78 
Peer group beliefs Means 
Percentage of senders deceiving in the scenario    
Scenario 1 (low+;low-) 21.03 18.85 20.55 
Scenario 2 (low+;high-) 20.67 18.47 19.74 
Scenario 3 (high+;high-) 26.23 23.66 25.20 
             Table 4 
             Sender beliefs across treatments (rounds 1-9). 
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Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests show that the senders' expected probability of their 
counterpart accepting the message is moderately lower with reporting systems (p=0.024 for T_exo 
and p=0.015 for T_endo). There is no significant difference between the two report types. A possible 
explanation for why senders expect a lower acceptance rate with reporting systems is based on the 
fact that information about their dishonesty will potentially be stored in their report list and shown to 
their future counterparts. Receivers might therefore be more aware of the senders' overall dishonesty 
than in the baseline with only bilateral reputation, and might show less trust in the received messages. 
However, this decrease in expected acceptance amounts to less than five percentage points in both 
treatments with reporting systems. 
The significant difference in second-order beliefs between T_base and T_exo (p=0.020) is in line with 
this explanation, since significantly fewer senders think that their counterparts expect to gain 
relatively more from the message when computer reports are available. The percentage of the second-
order beliefs is not significantly different between T_base and T_endo (p=0.251). However, it is 
puzzling that the fraction of senders with high second-order beliefs is significantly higher in T_endo 
compared to T_exo (p=0.003) since there are no differences in first-order beliefs between these two 
treatments. In terms of relative payoff expectations, it seems as if senders expect receivers to rely 
relatively more on the effect of reports when they are written by them or their peers. This expectation 
is actually supported by the general pattern in receiver behavior presented in the following 
subsection. 
Regarding peer beliefs, we find that slightly fewer senders expect their peers to deceive in a specific 
scenario when reports are used, but these differences are not significant. The only exception is the 
difference between the baseline and computer reports in scenario 3 (p<0.001). 
Furthermore, we used Cuzick trend tests to analyze the development of the elicited beliefs from round 
1 to 9 and find that the senders' first-order and peer expectations do not change significantly in any 
treatment and scenario combination. On the other hand, we find a significant upward trend of the 
senders' second-order beliefs (p<0.1 in all treatments) that we present in Figure 3. This trend implies 
that senders expect their counterparts to trust them more over time. 
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  Figure 3 
  Senders' average second order beliefs per treatment. 
We turn now to an econometric model with which we analyze the effects of treatment modifications, 
individual beliefs and socio-economic factors on sender behavior. We use multi-level mixed-effects 
logistic regressions in order to account for the panel structure of our data and, at the same time, to 
control for correlation within the groups in which senders and receivers are matched. Since honesty 
was not the only alternative to deception in our design, we ran separate regressions for these two 
types of sender behavior. The dependent variable for deception (honesty) takes the value 1 in case the 
sender sent a deceptive (an honest) message and zero otherwise. T_exo and T_endo capture whether 
the subject participated in one of the respective treatments with reporting systems. Since reports 
were only provided in rounds in which the whole payoff information was revealed to the receiver, a 
standard time variable would not cope with our aim to investigate the long-term effect of reporting 
sender behavior. Therefore, we use a more elaborated time variable named "Revealed dishonesty", 
which captures a sender's public reputation by showing the number of times a dishonest action of the 
sender was reported, up to the respective round.9 
All elicited belief types are included in the models. The belief variable First-order_follow captures the 
sender's subjective probability with which the receivers follow a message, while Second-order_more 
is a binary variable that takes the value 1 in case a sender believes that his counterpart expects a 
relatively higher payoff from the message. Peer_group_lying captures the sender's subjective 
probability of other senders transmitting a deceptive message in a specific scenario. Furthermore, we 
control for gender (Female) and use the binary variable Siblings_max_one which takes the value 1 in 
case the subject has not more than one sibling. Since we invited subjects from different faculties, we 
also included a dummy variable for being an economics or business student. The variable Grant 
captures if the subjects receive any kind of financial aid for their studies. 
                                                 
9  In T_endo, we included the actual receiver report based on our qualitative analysis presented in subsection 4.5, i.e. 
controlling for missing or false reports. 
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Treatment and belief effects 
 Scenario 1  
 (low+;low-) 
 Scenario 2  
 (low+;high-) 
 Scenario 3  
 (high+;high-) 
Deception 
T_exo -0.664** (0.260) -0.791** (0.348) -0.561* (0.289) 
T_endo -0.344 (0.260) -0.563 (0.346) -0.290 (0.294) 
Revealed_dishonesty   0.062 (0.059)   0.013 (0.063) -0.009 (0.060) 
First-order_follow   0.028*** (0.004)   0.025*** (0.004)   0.033*** (0.004) 
Second-order_more   0.002 (0.140)   0.129 (0.149) -0.032 (0.144) 
Peer_group_lying   0.007*** (0.002)   0.006*** (0.002)   0.007*** (0.002) 
Female   0.814*** (0.152)   1.231*** (0.167)   0.284* (0.152) 
Siblings_max_one   0.081 (0.178)   0.312 (0.199) -0.145 (0.184) 
Economics_Business   0.125 (0.151)   0.046 (0.163)   0.056 (0.156) 
Grant   0.129 (0.159) -0.166 (0.172) -0.554*** (0.163) 
Constant -2.119*** (0.330) -2.352*** (0.380) -0.838** (0.333) 
Wald 91.43*** 99.06*** 100.71*** 
Honesty 
T_exo   0.608** (0.248)   0.606** (0.268)   0.439 (0.313) 
T_endo   0.401 (0.251)   0.599** (0.270)   0.245 (0.317) 
Revealed_dishonesty -0.209*** (0.061) -0.193*** (0.059) -0.117* (0.070) 
First-order_follow   0.001 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) -0.015*** (0.004) 
Second-order_more   0.314** (0.138)   0.130 (0.137)   0.360** (0.159) 
Peer_group_lying -0.004* (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) -0.005** (0.002) 
Female -0.590*** (0.147) -0.922*** (0.149) -0.029 (0.170) 
Siblings_max one -0.345* (0.178) -0.537*** (0.179) -0.132 (0.202) 
Economics_Business   0.082 (0.148)   0.223 (0.149)   0.201 (0.175) 
Grant -0.301* (0.157) -0.165 (0.156)   0.265 (0.179) 
Constant -0.197 (0.308)   0.532* (0.314) -0.849** (0.362) 
Wald 47.11*** 67.36*** 29.91*** 
N 1080 1080 1080 
Groups 30 30 30 
Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 5 
Multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression models for senders’ choice of deceptive and honest messages 
(rounds 1-9). 
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 5. By controlling for other potential determinants 
of sender behavior, such as individual beliefs, we get a clear picture of the report types' efficacy in 
reducing deception. While computer reports lead to a significant decrease in the fraction of deceptive 
messages in scenarios 1 and 2 in addition to a marginally significant effect in the large stakes scenario 
3, receiver reports do not show such an impact on deception in any of the scenarios. Consistently, the 
provision of computer reports significantly increased the rate of honest messages in the first two 
scenarios but not in scenario 3, while receiver reports only show a significant effect in the mean 
scenario 2. When we compare sender behavior between the different payoff scenarios in T_exo, we 
find that the reduction in deception is stronger in scenario 2 than in the other payoff scenarios. 
Regarding honesty, there is almost no difference between scenario 1 and 2 in T_exo. 
Our time variable regarding revealed dishonesty does not affect the sending of deceptive messages in 
any scenario. On the other hand, the relative probability of senders being honest decreases over time 
with the number of reported dishonesty in scenarios 1 and 2. This effect is marginally significant in 
scenario 3. These results are in line with the time trends we observed in the previous subsection, i.e. 
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that the fraction of deceptive messages exhibits an upward trend only in some treatment and scenario 
combinations whereas honesty decreases in almost all cases. 
Result 5: Exogenous reports are a more effective measure to reduce deception in favor of increasing 
honesty than endogenous reports, also when controlling for individual beliefs.  
We now have a look at the coefficients of the two counterpart-related belief types, which show an 
interesting discrepancy between deception and honesty. Observe in Table 5 that deceptive senders 
are affected by their first-order beliefs in all cases and that second-order beliefs do not correlate with 
their decision to deceive in any of the scenarios. By contrast, senders who choose honest messages are 
indeed influenced by their beliefs about their counterparts’ payoff expectations in scenarios 1 and 3, 
while first-order beliefs only affect them, to a comparatively lower extent, in scenario 3. This 
discrepancy implies that selfish senders are mostly driven by strategic considerations in terms of the 
actual message acceptance since receivers have a say in the outcome of the game, whereas senders 
who choose honest messages tend to incorporate their counterparts' expectations when making 
decisions, which is closely related to guilt aversion. The senders' peer beliefs correlate significantly 
with their behavior in the sense that the relative probability of sending a deceptive message is higher 
when a sender expects others to deceive the receiver in the respective scenario, and vice-versa for 
choosing an honest message. This effect is only marginally significant regarding honest messages in 
scenario 1. However, the coefficients show that these beliefs have a relatively small effect on sender 
behavior in our experiment. 
Result 6: Senders who choose deceptive messages are mainly driven by first-order beliefs, which play an 
important role for strategic considerations, while senders who choose honest messages are mainly 
influenced by second-order beliefs, which are related to guilt aversion. 
Finally, we find that socio-economic factors have only a limited impact on senders’ behavior. The only 
effects that are significant at conventional levels consist of senders choosing honest messages with a 
lower relative probability in the mean scenario 2 when they have more than one sibling and senders 
being less inclined to send deceptive messages in the high stakes scenario 3 when they receive a grant. 
Surprisingly, we find that the relative probability of sending deceptive (honest) messages increases 
(decreases) significantly for female subjects. This finding is in contrast to the results of the one-shot 
version of our game in Behnk et al. (2014), where no significant gender differences were found at 
conventional levels, similar to Childs (2012). Furthermore, the finding is in contract with a series of 
studies that find a higher rate of deceptive messages for men in sender-receiver games, such as Dreber 
and Johannesson (2008) or Houser et al. (2012). When we compare the average rates of messages 
between men and women, we find more women lying in each scenario and treatment combination, 
except for scenario 3 in T_exo and T_endo, where fractions are almost identical. Since the gender effect 
is also present in the baseline, it cannot be attributed to the different report types. We propose that 
the gender effect is due to the repeated game structure but this suggestion needs further exploration 
in future studies. 
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4.3 Receiver behavior 
We turn now to receivers’ behavior and illustrate in Figure 4 the development of the fractions of those 
receivers who accepted the message they got from their counterpart in the respective rounds. On 
average, 44.4% of the receivers accepted the transmitted message in T_base.10 The average acceptance 
rate is slightly higher in T_exo, 49.7%, but this difference is not significant according to a McNemar 
test (p=0.156). On the other hand, receivers accepted on average significantly more messages in 
T_endo (54.8%) compared to the baseline (p=0.002). Overall, the application of the endogenous 
reporting system increases the acceptance rate compared to the reporting-free setting significantly, 
but the presence of the exogenous reporting system does not. Hence, while it is mostly the computer 
reports that actually lead to a lower rate of deceptive messages, receivers tend to back the wrong 
horse by trusting their counterparts to a higher extent when reports are written by their peers than 
when they are generated by the computer. 
Result 7: The endogenous reporting system leads to a significantly higher rate of accepted messages 
compared to the reporting-free baseline, while the exogenous reporting system does not. 
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 Figure 4 
 Acceptance rates per treatment. 
With regard to the development of receiver behavior over time, we calculated the fractions of 
receivers accepting a message at the group level in each round and used the Cuzick trend test. We find 
that acceptance rates follow a significant upward trend from rounds 1 to 9 in T_exo (p=0.007) while 
the fractions are stable in T_base and T_endo. Although the overall message acceptance is only higher 
with receiver reports, the computer reports seem to gradually enhance the level of trust over time 
after the decrease in the first periods. Therefore, it could be possible that computer reports reach a 
substantially higher trust level with an increased number of interactions among the group members. 
We explore this possibility in section 4.5. 
                                                 
10  In order to make the analyses comparable to the ones used for sender behavior and to control for a possible 
endgame effect, we excluded the last round from our tests and regression models. 
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4.4 Receiver beliefs 
In line with our analysis of sender behavior, we also explore the impact of individual beliefs on 
receiver decisions in our experiment. Table 6 shows the means of receivers' first-order beliefs 
regarding percentages of senders who send honest messages, which vary between 38% and 45% 
among the treatments. Both mean values in T_exo and T_endo are significantly higher compared to the 
baseline (p<0.01 in both cases) but there is no significant difference between the two report types 
according to Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests. These results show that receivers assign 
both reporting systems an equally positive effect on sender actions. 
We also elicited the receivers' second-order beliefs in terms of their counterparts’ relative payoff 
expectations. On average between two thirds and three quarters of the receivers believe that the 
senders expect to gain relatively more from the message they sent. McNemar tests show that only the 
difference between T_base and T_endo is significant at conventional levels (p=0.033). This finding 
shows that receivers assign endogenous reports a positive impact on the senders' intentions and, 
hence, reflects the relatively higher acceptance rate in T_endo. Furthermore, receivers expect on 
average that only a small fraction of the other players in their own role, between 14% and 15%, accept 
the message they received. These fractions are similar across the three treatments according to 
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests but substantially lower than the actual acceptance rates 
we presented in Table 5. 
Receiver beliefs Treatments 
 T_base T_exo T_endo 
First-order beliefs about sender actions Means 
Percentage of senders sending honest message 37.91 43.13 44.53 
Second-order beliefs about relative payoffs Percentages 
Higher or much higher than receiver's payoffs 73.89 71.39 66.39 
Peer group beliefs Means 
Percentage of receivers accepting the message 13.95 14.85 14.87 
             Table 6 
             Receiver beliefs across treatments (rounds 1 to 9). 
Cuzick trend tests are used to analyze possible trends in the belief development over time. We find 
that all receiver beliefs are stable from rounds 1 to 9 except for a significant decrease of first-order 
beliefs in T_endo (p=0.014), i.e. with an increasing number of interactions, receivers think that a lower 
percentage of senders will transmit an honest message when the reports are endogenous. This result 
is in line with the lower impact of receiver reports on sender behavior. 
In the next step, we include treatment modifications, individual beliefs and socio-economic variables 
in a multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression model as we did in the analysis of sender behavior. 
The results are presented in Table 7. It turns out that receivers are mainly driven by their beliefs 
when they decide whether to accept a message, while the provision of reports does not correlate with 
the message acceptance in none of the two systems. Accordingly, receivers do not seem to care about 
the sender's long-term reputation in terms of the number of dishonesty revelations.  
 
22 
 
      Treatment and belief effects on message acceptance 
T_exo    0.081 (0.201) 
T_endo    0.220 (0.204) 
Revealed_dishonesty  -0.090 (0.062) 
First-order_honest    0.028*** (0.004) 
Second-order_more  -1.903*** (0.176) 
Peer_group_accept    0.007** (0.003) 
Female  -0.035 (0.150) 
Siblings_max one  -0.091 (0.164) 
Economics_Business  -0.006 (0.149) 
Grant  -0.094 (0.157) 
Constant    0.249 (0.329) 
Wald        198.67*** 
N        1080 
Groups        30 
 Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. 
 Standard errors in parentheses. 
 Table 7 
 Multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression models for receivers’ 
 message acceptance (rounds 1-9). 
First-order beliefs about the sender's honesty have a significantly positive impact on receiver 
behavior in the sense that receivers are more likely to accept a message when they think that senders 
send an honest message. Consistently, the relative probability of message acceptance decreases 
significantly when receivers think that their counterpart expects to obtain relatively higher earnings 
from the message. These second-order beliefs are the strongest determinant of acceptance rates. 
Furthermore, receivers are more likely to trust a sender when they expect their peers to accept the 
messages. We do not find significant gender differences among receivers. The same is true for the 
remaining socio-economic variables. 
Result 8: The difference in the rates of receivers’ message acceptance between the two reporting systems 
is mainly driven by receivers’ second-order beliefs. 
4.5 Qualitative analysis of receiver reports 
In Table 8 we present the results of our qualitative analysis of the receiver reports. Altogether, the 
sender behavior was revealed to the affected receivers 212 times in T_endo. Strikingly, the reports 
were not adequately provided by the receivers in almost one third of the reporting possibilities. We 
found that nearly every fifth affected receiver did not provide a report at all, leading to a blank line for 
the respective round in the sender's personal report list. One possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is that some receivers exhibit an aversion to damaging the reputation of others in the 
long run, since 85% of the missing reports appeared after the revelation of a dishonest message, 
although only in 67% of the revelations of sender behavior in T_endo, senders were actually 
dishonest. 
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Reporting possibilities  212 100% 
Missing, incorrect or unrelated reports  68 32,1% 
No report provided  40 18.9 % 
(missing reports after revealed dishonesty)  (34/40) (85.0%) 
Incorrect reports  25 11.8% 
(incorrect reports after revealed dishonesty)  (19/25) (76.0%) 
Unrelated information   3 1.4% 
Other information     
Emotional wording and/or emoticons  25 11.8% 
Ethical comment  25 11.8% 
Justification of own decision  6 2.8% 
History-related information  16 7.5% 
Reference to previous reports  3 1.4% 
Sender number mentioned  13 6.1% 
Scenario-specific information  17 8.0% 
Payoff-equalization reported  17 8.0% 
    Table 8 
    Qualitative analysis of receiver reports. 
Another 12% of the receivers provided an incorrect report, i.e. they wrote that the sender transmitted 
a dishonest message when in fact he sent an honest message and vice-versa. We cannot rule out that 
these reports were given because a receiver confused the payoffs shown to her in the end of the 
round. However, the majority of these reports were given after the receiver already provided other 
reports in a correct way, which demonstrates that she understood the general procedures of the game. 
Actually, we find that the majority of incorrect reports was provided when deceptive or payoff-
equalizing messages were sent to the receivers in the respective rounds. Although the small numbers 
of observations have to be interpreted with caution, the pattern suggests again that some receivers 
may be averse to negatively affecting the reputation of others. Finally, a small fraction of 1.4% of the 
receivers provided completely unrelated information in their reports, for instance by referring to the 
sender's risk attitudes. 
Result 9: A substantial fraction of all possible receiver reports was either not provided or included 
unrelated or incorrect information. 
Apart from the inadequate reporting, we also analyzed the way how reports were written and how the 
information was framed. In general, the language used in the reports was overall quite factual. 
Receivers used an emotional wording only in 12% of their reports. Around 15% of the senders made 
an ethical comment or justified their own decision, for instance, by commenting on the spitefulness of 
deception in scenario 2. Since the computer reports were standardized and did not include any 
information about the scenarios' degree of spitefulness, the receiver reports include additional 
information that might have intimidated selfish senders especially regarding scenario 2 and, hence, 
might have played a role in the stronger effect of endogenous reports in this scenario compared to the 
other scenarios. Other receivers mentioned their indifference regarding selfish sender behavior in the 
first scenario, where the payoff misalignment was relatively low, or even approved such a behavior. 
However, none of the subjects used swearwords or insulted other participants, which they knew was 
prohibited and would result in final earnings of zero. Furthermore, receivers were quite focused on 
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the sender behavior in the present round. Not even 10% of them related their information to previous 
interactions with the same sender or to other reports in his personal list. Finally, 16% of the receivers 
provided payoff-specific information in their report and showed thereby that they learned at least 
some of the different payoff distributions over time. 
5. LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF REPORTING 
The experiment reported in the previous sections is based on situations in which subjects play the 
repeated sender-receiver game over ten rounds and where reporting is possible only in 50% of the 
cases. Such a setup represents a typical setting in daily economic life, where it is not possible to find 
out about the counterpart’s honesty in each and every case and, hence, repeated interactions between 
the same market participants are possible but not frequent, such as in e-commerce.  
In this section, we report the results of two additional treatments that we ran with a longer time 
horizon. We compare here exogenous and endogenous reporting systems with an increased number 
of interactions and, hence, more available information about revealed sender behavior.  
Instead of the previous ten rounds game, we ran two additional treatments with twenty rounds, one 
with computer-generated reports (henceforth called T_exo_20) and one with reports written by 
receivers (T_endo_20). The game structure, the treatment specifications of computer and receiver 
reports, as well as the experimental procedures were identical to the ten rounds game with one 
exception besides the higher number of rounds: we applied the time-consuming elicitation of peer 
beliefs for both player types in rounds 1 and 19 (in contrast to rounds 1, 5, 9, and 10 in the ten 
reounds game). Furthermore, we improved the efficiency of the program used during the sessions (z-
Tree; Fischbacher, 2007) in order to minimize subjects’ participation time in the new treatments. As a 
consequence, the sessions with twenty rounds lasted around 2 hours and 15 minutes, close to the 2 
hours average duration of the sessions with ten rounds, leading to an average payment of 25 euro per 
subject in the additional treatments. 
Overall, 80 subjects participated in the additional treatments, consisting of 20 senders and 20 
receivers in both T_exo_20 (50.0% female subjects) and T_endo_20 (35.0% female subjects). The 
average fractions of messages chosen by senders are displayed in Table 9. Fully in line with our results 
from the ten rounds game, observe that senders chose significantly fewer deceptive messages in the 
treatment with computer-generated reports than in the one with reports written by receivers for all 
three payoff scenarios. In contrast to the ten rounds game, we also find significantly higher fractions of 
honest messages under exogenous than under endogenous reporting. 
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  Average fractions - % Differences - McNemar's chi2 
Message type Scenario 
   T_exo_20 
(rounds 1-10 / 11-19) 
  T_endo_20 
(rounds 1-10 / 11-19) 
   T_exo_20 vs. T_endo20 
 (within each treatment: 
rounds 1-10 vs. 11-19) 
 1 
19.2  
(23.5 / 14.4) 
37.6 
(38.0 / 37.2) 
 28.49*** 
(4.25**)                (0.01) 
Deception 2 
19.0 
(24.5 / 12.8) 
32.6 
(35.0 / 30.0) 
 18.52*** 
     (7.00***)             (1.08) 
 3 
49.7 
(51.0 / 48.3) 
63.7 
(61.5 / 66.1) 
 13.98*** 
(0.13)                    (0.82) 
 1 
57.9 
(60.5 / 55.0) 
43.4 
(45.5 / 41.1) 
 17.09*** 
(2.88*)                  (1.43) 
Honesty 2 
58.4 
(60.5 / 56.1) 
50.0 
(49.5 / 50.6) 
   5.75** 
(1.57)                    (0.01) 
 3 
31.0 
(25.6 / 36.0) 
18.7 
(23.0 / 13.9) 
 15.67*** 
(8.73***)           (5.67**) 
Payoff-
equalization 
1 
22.9 
(16.0 / 30.6) 
19.0 
(16.5 / 21.7) 
   2.27 
(21.56***)            (2.28) 
2 
22.6 
(15.0 / 31.1) 
17.4 
(15.5 / 19.4) 
   3.92** 
(22.26***)            (1.39) 
3 
19.2 
(13.0 / 26.1) 
17.6 
(15.5 / 20.0) 
   0.32 
(19.7***)               (1.88) 
         Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1 
 Table 9 
 Average message fractions and McNemar test results for differences in sender behavior in each payoff 
 scenario in T_exo_20 and T_endo_20 (rounds 1-19). 
When we compare the first half (rounds 1-10) and the second half of the game (rounds 11-19), we 
find that computer reports reduce deception to a higher extent the more the game advances. In 
T_exo_20, the fractions of deceptive messages are significantly lower in the second half of the game 
compared to the first half in scenarios 1 and 2, but not in the high stake scenario 3, as shown in the 
right column of Table 9. Moreover, in line with this pattern, we observe a significant increase in honest 
messages in scenario 3 in T_exo_20. Senders also choose significantly more payoff-equalizing 
messages in the second half of the game with computer reports. 
By contrast, with receiver reports, the fractions of the message types do not change significantly from 
the first to the second half of the game. Only the fraction of honest messages is significantly lower in 
later rounds in scenario 3 of T_endo_20. This pattern, in combination with the fact that deceptive 
(honest) messages are comparatively more (less) frequent with endogenous than with exogenous 
reporting, is in line with the assumption that senders may anticipate a high number of incomplete 
receiver reports from the beginning and do not adjust their behavior over time in T_endo_20. The 
development per message type over time is illustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 
Fractions of messages chosen by senders per scenario and treatment in T_exo_20 and T_endo_20 (x-axis: rounds; 
y-axis: message fractions). 
We also take senders’ beliefs and socio-demographic characteristics into account and present the 
results of multi-level mixed-effects logistic regressions in Table 10, which are similar to the models 
used in subsection 4.2 for the ten rounds game. The dependent dummy variable for deception 
(honesty) takes the value 1 in case the sender sent a deceptive (an honest) message and zero 
otherwise. Our main variable of interest is Exogenous, which takes the value 1 (0) when the subject 
participated in T_exo_20 (T_endo_20). Revealed_dishonesty captures a sender's public reputation by 
showing the number of times a dishonest action of the sender was reported, up to the respective 
round. First-order_follow captures the sender's subjective probability with which receivers accept a 
message. Second-order_more takes the value 1 in case a sender believes that his counterpart expects a 
relatively higher payoff from the message she receives. Besides controlling for gender, 
Siblings_max_one takes the value 1 in case the subject has not more than one sibling, 
Economics_Business takes the value 1 if the subject is an economics or business student, and the 
dummy variable Grant captures if the subjects receive any kind of financial aid for their studies. 
 
 
Treatment and belief effects 
 Scenario 1  
 (low+;low-) 
 Scenario 2  
 (low+;high-) 
 Scenario 3  
 (high+;high-) 
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Deception 
T_exo_20 -1.150*** (0.349) -0.706* (0.394) -0.794** (0.356) 
Revealed_dishonesty -0.126*** (0.047) -0.163*** (0.049) -0.038 (0.041) 
First-order_follow  0.004 (0.005)  0.005 (0.005)  0.025*** (0.004) 
Second-order_more -0.290 (0.182) -0.103 (0.189)  0.190 (0.172) 
Peer_group_lying  0.008** (0.004)  0.010** (0.004)  0.009** (0.004) 
Female -0.319 (0.222) -0.123 (0.224) -0.253 (0.184) 
Siblings_max_one -0.041 (0.259) -0.907*** (0.260)  0.072 (0.233) 
Economics_Business -0.592** (0.241) -0.199 (0.249) -0.057 (0.213) 
Grant -0.006 (0.212) -0.195 (0.221)  0.251 (0.197) 
Constant  0.062 (0.414)  0.141 (0.440) -0.708* (0.393) 
Wald 31.49*** 38.66*** 49.03*** 
Honesty 
T_exo_20  0.570 (0.595)  0.270 (0.694)  0.750** (0.361) 
Revealed_dishonesty -0.041 (0.045) -0.001 (0.044) -0.139*** (0.049) 
First-order_follow  0.021*** (0.005)  0.015*** (0.005) -0.007 (0.005) 
Second-order_more  0.903*** (0.179)  0.663*** (0.178)  0.275 (0.190) 
Peer_group_lying  0.001 (0.004) -0.005 (0.004) -0.003 (0.004) 
Female -0.452** (0.200) -0.279 (0.203)  0.196 (0.204) 
Siblings_max one  1.103*** (0.265)  1.891*** (0.286)  1.161*** (0.292) 
Economics_Business  0.158 (0.225)  0.094 (0.225)  0.079 (0.234) 
Grant  0.313 (0.203)  0.489** (0.205) -0.045 (0.218) 
Constant -2.559*** (0.550) -2.620*** (0.610) -2.068*** (0.438) 
Wald 71.40*** 74.95*** 35.99*** 
N 760 760 760 
Groups 10 10 10 
Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 10 
Multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression models for senders’ choice of deceptive and honest messages in 
T_exo_20 and T_endo_20 (rounds 1-19). 
In line with our non-parametric test results, the regressions in Table 10 show that senders in the 
presence of computer reports are significantly less inclined to choose deceptive messages than those 
in the presence of receiver reports. Furthermore, there is a significant impact of being in T_exo_20 
instead of T_endo_20 on senders’ choice of honest messages in scenario 3.  
Observe that, in contrast to the regression results for the ten rounds game in Table 5 above, first-order 
beliefs do not have a significant impact on senders’ decisions to choose deceptive messages in 
scenarios 1 and 2, but in turn the number of previously revealed dishonest acts is relevant in these 
scenarios. Interestingly, the opposite is true for scenario 3, where senders can gain relatively higher 
amounts from successful deception. It seems that when monetary incentives are high, senders decide 
whether to choose a deceptive message more strategically, depending on their expectation of their 
counterparts’ message acceptance or rejection. In the case of honest messages, this pattern is 
reversed. Finally, senders’ beliefs of their peers’ behavior show a similar pattern as in the ten rounds 
game. Furthermore, in contrast to the ten rounds game, there is no gender effect on choosing 
deceptive messages when senders play the twenty rounds game, except that female senders choose 
fewer honest messages in payoff scenario 1. 
With regards to receiver behavior in the twenty rounds game, we observe a higher rate of message 
acceptance in T_endo_20 (48.2%) than in T_exo_20 (42.6%). However, a McNemar test shows that the 
difference between the two reporting systems is not significant considering all rounds (p=0.144). 
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Interestingly, we observe similar rates of message acceptance in rounds 1 to 10 of the game (54.0% in 
T_exo_20 and 54.5% in T_endo_20) while the acceptance rates increase to 61.1% in T_exo_20 and 
decrease to 48.9% in T_endo_20 in rounds 11 to 19. This increased difference in acceptance rates 
between exogenous and endogenous reporting systems in the second half of the game is significant 
according to a McNemar test (p=0.019). Hence, we can confirm the indication from the ten rounds 
game that receivers learn indeed over time given that they show relatively more trust with computer 
reports than with receiver reports in later rounds. This tendency can also be observed in Figure 6. 
 
  Figure 6 
  Acceptance rates per treatment in T_exo_20 and T_endo_20. 
In line with our procedure in subsection 4.4, we also ran multi-level mixed-effects logistic regressions 
with receivers’ trust in terms of their acceptance of the sender’s message as the dependent variable. 
We control for receivers participating in T_exo_20 (vs. T_ endo_20), the number of times a dishonest 
action of the sender was reported, first- and second-order beliefs and the same socio-demographic 
controls as in the models for the ten rounds game in Table 7. The results reported in Table 11 are 
similar to the ones of the ten rounds game in the sense that receivers are mainly driven by their 
beliefs when they decide whether to accept a message. 
 
 
 
      Treatment and belief effects on message acceptance 
T_exo_20   0.239 (0.369) 
Revealed_dishonesty  -0.031 (0.049) 
First-order_honest   0.037*** (0.006) 
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Second-order_more  -2.924*** (0.249) 
Peer_group_accept   0.005 (0.006) 
Female   0.281 (0.241) 
Siblings_max one  -0.249 (0.279) 
Economics_Business   1.200*** (0.218) 
Grant  -0.042 (0.238) 
Constant  -0.114 (0.468) 
Wald   179.70*** 
N   760 
Groups   10 
 Note: *** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value < 0.1. 
 Standard errors in parentheses. 
 Table 11 
 Multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression models for the receivers’  
 message acceptance in T_exo_20 and T_endo_20 (rounds 1-19). 
With regards to the qualitative analysis of receiver reports, we found again that a substantial part 
(24.2%) of the 190 reports that could have been written by receivers in T_endo_20 was either not 
provided by the receivers (14.2%) or included unclear (4.2%) or incorrect (5.8%) information.  
Overall, the twenty rounds game provides evidence that the patterns of sender and receiver behavior 
that we observed in the previous experiment are robust when we let subjects play the repeated 
sender-receiver game with a longer time horizon. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we conducted an experiment to investigate the effect of reporting systems on deceptive 
behavior. We used a repeated sender-receiver game with various payoff scenarios to compare two 
different report types, exogenous ones that are generated by the computer in a standardized way and 
endogenous reports in form of an individual text written by the receivers. We were mainly interested 
in answering the question if the reliability or the personal character of reports is more effective in 
reducing deception. 
Our analysis of sender behavior shows that the use of both report types leads to a significantly lower 
level of deception compared to the baseline without reports. Furthermore, we find that computer 
reports lead to a significantly lower deception level than receiver reports in each payoff scenario. 
Regarding the development over time, our analyses show that deception increases over time with 
receiver reports, while the rate of deceptive messages does not change when computer reports are 
provided. It turns out that deceptive behavior is rather driven by the strategic first-order beliefs 
whereas sending honest messages is mostly determined by the guilt aversion-related second-order 
beliefs. 
Receivers show relatively more trust compared to the baseline when endogenous reports are 
provided, whereas exogenous reporting does not have a significant effect on trust. This finding reveals 
an interesting discrepancy between the agents’ and their principals’ perception of the two report 
types. On the other hand, we find that computer reports gradually enhance the level of trust over time 
and conclude that receivers might realize in the long run that the reliability of the exogenous reports 
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leads to comparatively less deception. Receiver behavior is mainly driven by changes in their second-
order beliefs. 
A qualitative analysis of the receiver reports provides a potential explanation for the lower deception 
level with computer reports. It turns out that a substantial fraction of the receivers did not use the 
opportunity to report senders of dishonest messages in a proper way. We suppose that the 
comparably lower impact of the endogenous reports is due to an anticipation of the high number of 
missing, incorrect or unrelated reports by the senders. Interestingly, the high number of missing 
reports after successful deception implies that some receivers experience an aversion to damage the 
reputation of others. 
As a robustness check of our analysis, we conducted additional sessions in which subjects played the 
repeated sender-receiver game for a higher number of rounds in order to evaluate the effect of both 
reporting systems with a longer time horizon. We were able to confirm the superiority of computer 
reports over receiver reports in the reduction of deceptive messages in all payoff scenarios. 
Furthermore, we can confirm the indication from the ten rounds game that receivers learn over time 
in the sense that they show relatively more trust with exogenous reports than with endogenous 
reports in the long run. 
Altogether, we can conclude that the reliability of the exogenous reports has a higher impact on pro-
social behavior in our setting than the personal character of endogenous reports. Strikingly, receivers 
seem to trust the wrong system initially with a shorter time horizon. Especially in the light of the 
popular consumer ratings in E-commerce (Dellarocas, 2003), we propose that the importance of an 
externally regulated reporting system should not be underestimated. 
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APPENDIX 
Instructions for the experimental subjects (translated from Spanish) 
Welcome to this experiment, we greatly appreciate your participation. From this moment on, please 
switch off your cell phone and do not talk or communicate in any way with the other participants. 
Read these instructions carefully and raise your hand if you have any questions during the session. 
One of the officials of the experiment will answer your questions individually. 
Your decisions in this experiment will allow you to earn a certain amount of money that we will pay 
you in cash at the end of the session.  
You will be a player in a two-player game which will be played for ten [Treatments T_exo_20 and 
T_endo_20: twenty] rounds. Therefore, the computer will assign the players to groups of eight and you 
will part of one of the groups. Within the group, four of you (labeled I to IV) will be randomly assigned 
the role of "Player 1" and the other four (also labeled I to IV) the role of "Player 2". Your role and your 
number will be the same until the session ends. In each round, the computer will randomly match you 
with one of the other participants with the opposite role in your group. None of the players will ever 
know the real identity of the other players, only the number of the player he/she is matched with in a 
round. 
You will make your decisions during the game through the computer in front of you. After the ten 
[Treatments T_exo_20 and T_endo_20: twenty] rounds, the experiment will end and you will be 
asked to fill in a short questionnaire. 
Decision Making Player 1 
In each round, we will present three scenarios to player 1, each one them contains three options. Each 
option consists of a payoff for both players. This is the general structure of the options in each 
scenario that will be presented to Player 1: 
 
Option A: Player 1 receives ... euros and player 2 receives ... euros. 
Option B: Player 1 receives ... euros and player 2 receives ... euros. 
Option C: Player 1 receives ... euros and player 2 receives ... euros. 
 
We will present to Player 1 (and only to him/her) the payoffs for both players of each option and in 
each scenario (the order of the options is at random). By contrast, Player 2 will not get this 
information. Player 1's task is to choose one of the following three messages that will be sent to Player 
2 afterwards: 
 
Message 1: Option A will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 2: Option B will earn you more money than the other two options. 
Message 3: Option C will earn you more money than the other two options. 
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Remember that there are three scenarios. In each scenario, Player 1 has to decide which message 
he/she wants to be sent to Player 2 in case this scenario will be selected.  
After Player 1 has chosen a message for each scenario, the computer will randomly select one of the 
scenarios. This scenario will then be implemented and the specific message that Player 1 chose for this 
scenario will be sent to Player 2. From this moment on, it will depend on the decision of Player 2 
which of the three corresponding options will be implemented and, according to this, which amount of 
money both players will earn. 
Decision Making Player 2 
Player 2 knows about the three options in the selected scenario but he/she knows nothing about the 
payoffs associated with each option. He/she receives the message that Player 1 chose for the 
implemented scenario. After receiving the message, Player 2 has to decide whether to "accept" or 
"reject" the message: 
 To "accept" the message means that Player 2 accepts the information of the message and that 
the option mentioned in the message determines the earnings of the two players. 
 To "reject" the message means that Player 2 does not want the option mentioned in the 
message but one of the other option to determine the earnings of both players. 
Therefore, if Player 2 accepts the message, the option in the message will be implemented and 
determines the payoffs of the players in this round. In the case that Player 2 rejects the message, one 
of the remaining options of the selected scenario will be randomly implemented by the computer in 
order to determine the earnings of both players in this round. 
[Treatments T_exo and T_exo_20: 
From the second round on, and before making his/her decision, we will show a display to Player 2. In this 
display we will present information about Player 1's decisions to send honest or dishonest messages to 
his/her respective counterparts in the previous rounds. In those rounds in which his/her behavior has not 
been revealed, which happens with 50% probability, no information will be shown. 
There are three possible reports with which the computer classifies Player 1's actual behavior in each of 
the previous rounds: 
 "Player 1 has sent an honest message" 
 "Player 1 has sent a dishonest message" 
 "No information"   (for rounds in which the behavior of Player 1 has not been revealed) 
The following display is an example of how the information is presented to Player 2 (referring to the first 
six rounds including the three possible reports mentioned before; the displayed order is just an example): 
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Player 1 will also get this information at the beginning of each round.] 
[Treatments T_endo and T_endo_20: 
From the second round on, and before making his/her decision, we will show a display to Player 2. In this 
display we will present information about Player 1's decisions to send honest or dishonest messages to 
his/her respective counterparts in the previous rounds. The presented reports have been written 
voluntarily by the Player 2s with whom this specific Player 1 was matched in the previous rounds. 
In each round in which his/her behavior has not been revealed, which happens with 50% probability, 
there is no information available and, as a consequence, the respective Player 2 did not have the 
possibility to write a report. Additionally, Player 2 has the possibility to not write a report. In this case 
there is also no information available. 
The following display is an example of how the information is presented to Player 2 (referring to the first 
six rounds including the available reports; the displayed order is just an example): 
 
Player 1 will also get this information at the beginning of each round. 
Accordingly, after making his/her decision, Player 2 has the possibility to write a text with a maximum of 
140 characters in each round that informs the following Player 2s about whether Player 1 has sent an 
honest or a dishonest message in the current round. The text can be written freely and individually, 
taking into account that any swearwords or insults are totally prohibited. In case a participant does not 
stick to this rule, his/her earnings will be zero.] 
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Earnings 
In each round you will answer some short questions once you have made your decisions but before 
your earnings are shown on the screen. We will pay you an additional amount depending on the 
precision of your answers. 
After that, at the end of each round, 
 Player 1 will receive information about the acceptance or rejection of her message, the 
implemented option corresponding to the scenario that was selected by the computer and the 
earnings of both players. 
 In principle, Player 2 will only receive information about her own payoff. Furthermore, a 
possibility exists that the computer decides to provide additional information to player 2 
about all potential payoffs for both players of each option in the implemented scenario. The 
probability of this happening is 50%. 
After the end of the ten [Treatments T_exo_20 and T_endo_20: twenty] rounds, we will pay you your 
earnings from two rounds that will be randomly chosen by the computer. On the last screen we will 
present your final earnings that we will pay you anonymously in cash at the end of the session. 
Do you have any questions about these instructions? If so, please raise your hand. If you do not have 
any questions, remain silent until you get instructions from the experimenter. 
Summary 
- The game will be played for ten [Treatments T_exo_20 and T_endo_20: twenty] rounds. In each 
round each Player 1 will be matched randomly with one Player 2 from the same group (which consists 
of eight players from this session). 
- There are three scenarios, each one them contains three options. Player 1 knows the payoffs for both 
players of each option. Player 2 does not receive this information. 
- After Player 1 has chosen a message for each scenario, the computer will randomly select one of the 
scenarios and the corresponding message will be sent to Player 2. 
[Treatments T_exo and T_exo_20: 
- Player 2 will receive the message and, from the second round on, a display with reports about Player 1's 
behavior in the previous rounds in which his/her behavior has been revealed.] 
[Treatments T_endo and T_endo_20: 
- Player 2 will receive the message and, from the second round on, a display with reports about Player 1's 
behavior in the previous rounds in which his/her behavior has been revealed. The reports have been 
written by the respective Player2s.] 
- Player 2 decides whether to accept or reject the received message. In the case of acceptance, the 
option mentioned in the message will be implemented. In case of rejection, the computer will 
randomly select one of the remaining options in order to determine the earnings of both players. 
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- With 50% probability, Player 2 will receive information about all options and payoffs in the 
implemented scenario at the end of each round. 
[Treatments T_endo and T_endo_20: 
In this case, after making his/her decision, Player 2 has the possibility to write a text that informs the 
following Player 2s about if Player 1 has sent an honest or a dishonest message in the current round.] 
